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EMPLOYMENT STABILITY UNDER DIFFERENT
MANAGERIAL COMPENSA nON SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
Compensation design may influence the extent to which managerial
decision-makers take a long-term perspective in managing imponant resources
like employees. I hypothesize that organizations relying more heavily on long-
term compensation incentives exhibit greater stability in employment, perhaps
because of a greater concern among management with long-term effectiveness. I
also hypothesize that employment stability is more feasible when employees are
covered by variable pay plans, which permit labor cost reductions without cuts
in employment. Using multiple years of employment, fmancial performance, and
managerial compensation data on 156 organIzations, suppon is found for both
hypotheses.
Compensation and employment stability
3
INTRODUCTION
Research shows that organizations differ significantly in their managerial
compensation strategies (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Although there are some
differences in pay level, the most substantial differences appear to be in pay
mix. Gerhart and Milkovich found that organizations differed widely in terms of
their emphasis on bonus pay relative to base pay and in the percentage of
managers eligible for long-term incentives. Further, they found that
organizations higher on these pay mix (or variable pay) dimensions exhibited
bener fmandal performance than organizations that paid a greater share of
compensation in the form of base pay. These findings are consistent with
agency theory and expectancy theory predictions concerning the positive
behavioral effects of performance contingent pay.
Financial performance is, however, only one of many important
dimensions of organizational effectiveness and the importance of these multiple
dimensions may vary among different stakeholders. Employment stability (and
security) is an organization outcome that is likely to be important from both
employee and public policy perspectives. Additionally, as discussed below,
employment stability may~have a number of long ternl efficiency advantages that
may translate intO long term benefits for shareholders. Note that employment
stability does not pertain to staffing level, but rather to the degree of fluctuation
in staffmg level over time that is not attributable to fluctuations in product
demand (because labor is a derived demand).
In the present paper, I examine the role that compensation strategy plays
in the achievement of employment stability. Both expectancy theory and agency
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theory argue that compensation and reward systems are crucial for energizing,
directing, and sustaining behavior. Similarly, the managerial compensation
literature supports the notion that managerial behavior is significantly related to
the contingencies built into the managerial pay package, which may importantly
influence, for example, the relative degree of short term vs. long term orientation
of managers (Gomez-Mejia & WeJboume, 1989; Rappaport, 1978; Salter, 1973;
Stonich, 1981). Thus, decisions affecting employment stability may also depend
on the design of managerial compensation packages. Compensation may,
however, influence employment stability in another way also. To the extent that
employees' pay is variable (e.g., profit-sharing) rather than fixed (e.g., base
salary), organizations can achieve a degree of labor cost reduction without
employment reductions (Weitzman, 1984). In such cases, management will have
greater discretion to pursue an employment stability objective. My goal is to
examine the relation between employment stability and these two dimensions of
organization compensation strategy in U.S. organizations.
It is difficult to study employment stability without closely examining the
case of Japan. Thus, before turning specifically to the possible link between
compensation strategy and' employment stability, it may be useful to discuss why
some organizations in both the U.S. and Japan pursue employment stability as a
key objective. This discussion will, however, begin to illustrate the potential
imponance of compensation in such decisions.
Employment Stability in the U.S. and Japan
A common criticism of American management in general is that it
focuses too much on short-term performance rather than the long-term success of
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the organization (Business Week, 1986; Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Marshall &
Briggs, 1989, pp. 461-465; Reich, 1983, pp. 140-172). By contrast, the Japanese
are seen as having a more long-term orientation in their managerial decision-
making (Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1988; Jacofsky, Slocum & McQuaid, 1988).
One reason for taking note of the Japanese management approach to such issues
is their high rate of productivity growth. Neef and Thomas (1988) found that
during the 1960-1987 period, Japan's output per hour grew at an annual average
rate of 7.7%, compared to 2.8% for the U.S.
Part of the explanation for the Japanese success story is thought to be
found in their management of human resources. Japanese companies are often
described as treating employees not as a cost factor to be minimized, but as a
valuable resource that warrants careful investment and development over the long
term. One indicator of this philosophy is the shushin koyo or lifetime
employment system, which covers 30% or more of Japanese employees and
appears to be continuing to become more widespread (Dore, Bounine-Cabale, &
Tapiola, 1989, p. 61).
To be sure, there are also American companies that engage in what Dyer,
Foltman, and Milkovich (985) refer to as employment stabilization practices.]
However, several types of evidence suggest that long-term employment with a
single company is much less prevalent in the United States. First, the average
Japanese worker holds about 5 jobs before retiring, whereas an American worker
holds an average of to-II jobs prior to retirement (Hashimoto & Raisian, 1985).
Second, retention rates are significantly higher in Japan than in the United
States. For example, among male workers ages 20-24 with 0-5 years of tenure,
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45% were still with the same employer 15 years later in Japan, compared with
13% in the United States (Hashimoto & Raisian). Third, the median firm tenure
among private sector male workers is about twice as high in Japan as in the
United States (HashimotO, 1990). Founh, Dyer et al. estimated that "no more
than two or three dozen" United States employers had the type of employment
stabilization practices they studied and even some of these employers have since
abandoned the practice (Kochan, MacDuffie, & Osterman 1988).2 Kanter (1989,
p. 321), in fact, claims that "long-term employment is rapidly disappearing" in
the U.S. Finally, and perhaps most telling, the ratio of quits/dismissals in the
1975-1985 period for manufacturing ranged from 5-11 in Japan, compared to 0.1
to 0.4 in the U.S. (HashimotO, 1990a).3
Why Pursue Employment Stability?
Early explanations of employment stability in Japan focused on culture
and custom (Abegglen, 1958; Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, & Myers, 1960). For
example, Abegglen argued that "the Japanese factOry seems family-like in its
relations" and explained this as a "consistent and logical outgrowth of the kinds
of relations existing in Japan prior to its industrialization" (p. 130, cited in Shirai
.
& Shimada, 1978, p. 244). Similarly, Kerr et al. (p. 146) argued that "the non-
temporary Japanese worker has been as bound by custOm to his employer as if
he were in the closed circle of a preindustrial tribe. He would not think of
seeking alternate employment, nor would his employer ever try to dismiss him.
He has permanent membership in the enterprise" (cited in Shirai & Shimada, pp.
245-246).
Subsequent interpretations, however, have often focused more on the
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efficiency reasons for lifetime employment in Japan, as we]] as the specific
features of the Japanese system that serve to reinforce jr (Levine, 1958; Taira,
1970; Cole, 1971; Dore, 1973; for reviews, see Shirai & Shimada, 1978 and
Lincoln & Kalkberg, ] 985). Employment stability is believed to result in
Japanese employees being more flexible about their work roles and assignments,
more involved in their jobs, and more committed to the success of the
organization.4 In addition, the organization avoids losing its investments in
human capital, especially that of an organization-specific variety.
Dore et al. (1989) argue that "the most imponant source of flexibility for
the Japanese firm lies in the flexibility with which it can use its human
resources" (p. 50). They contend that the lifetime employment commitment
leads to:
a long-term membership in the firm. Managers and workers can
share the assumptions about the nature of their employment
contract--they are 'members' of the firm, hired to do whatever,
from time to time, needs doing in the firm's interest--not just to
perform a narrowly prescribed range of duties spelled out in a job
description or evaruated in a job evaluation scheme" (p. 5 I).5
One Japanese perspective on contrasting U.S. practices came from
Samadi Wada, Vice-president, Sony America: "I understand why some
American companies fail to gain the loyalty and dedication of their employees.
Employees cannot care for an employer who is prepared to take their livelihood
away at the first sign of trouble" (Tomasko, 1990, p. 255).
Two other piJ)ars of the prototypical Japanese employment system appear
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to facilitate employment stability and the associated flexibility: enterprise unions
and the bonus system. Enterprise unions, although influenced by other collective
bargaining agreements, do nOt formally engage in industry-wide bargaining, thus
allowing more flexibility in the agreements reached between particular employers
and unions. In addition, contracts are typically for a length of one year, which
is shoner than the typical duration (three years) in the V.S. Both factors
presumably contribute to greater flexibility in base wages among Japanese (vs.
V.S.) employers.
The third pillar (and another imponant source of labor cost flexibility) is
the Japanese bonus system. According to HashimOto (1990, p. 257), as of 1985,
production workers in manufacturing in Japan received, on average, 26% of their
direct annual pay in the form of bonuses. In contrast, V.S. production workers
received an average of 0.5% of their pay in the form of bonuses. Although
there has been a recent increase in the use of bonus payments in the V.S., the
difference between the two countries continues to be substantial.
The net result of the enterprise unions (and associated wage flexibility)
and bonus system appears to be greater pay flexibility in Japan, compared to the
V.S. For example, Gordon (1982) found that the variability in manufacturing
quarterly pay changes (including bonuses in Japan) was 1.9 to 2.9 times larger
in Japan than the V.S. during the ]963-]980 period.
In addition to flexibility through increased employee commitment and
involvement, a second pOtential efficiency advantage of employment stability is
the preservation of investments in employees (human capital). As Business
Week put it, workforce reductions save money in the shon-run, but "no one
Compensarion and employment stability
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knows the long-term effects of liquidating such huge investments in human
capital" (1986, p. 43). Human capital can be general or fmn-specific (Becker,
1962; Williamson, 1975). Acquiring firm-specific skills often requires leaming-
by-doing, which helps explain the existence of internal labor markets
characterized by limited entry from the external labor market and promotion
from within policies. These firm-specific skills may be of a technical nature,
but non-technical skills such as the interpersonal relations or political savvy
acquired over time that enable one to "work the system" to accomplish
objectives may be at least as important, especially for managers (Perry, 198_;
Tomasko, 1990). Obviously, investments in these firm-specific skills are lost
when employees leave the organization.
The focus on commitment, involvement, and investment can also be
found in the human resource (HR) strategy literature. For example, Dyer and
Holder (1988) describe three basic HR strategies. The inducement strategy seeks
to elicit very high levels of reliable role behavior, but initiative, innovation, and
creativity are at best minor concerns. Pay is the main motivator. The
investment and involvement strategies are quite different. The fonner focuses
heavily on employee quality through selection and development. The latter
focuses on the empowerment of employees. However, bOth the investment and
involvement strategies seek to encourage employee initiative, innovation,
creativity, and flexibility in the face of technological change. One key
requirement in obtaining these objectives is a high ]evel of organization
commitment on the part of employees. As Dyer and Holder note, avoiding
layoffs is therefore very important under bOth the investment and involver
Compensation and employment stabiJity
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strategies.
Thus, in both the U.S. and Japan, some organizations seek employment
stabiJity as a means of achieving high commitment, high involvement, and
flexibility among their workforces. Employment stability may also have a
positive impact on the reputation of the organization, which in turn, may help in
attracting and retaining employees. Somewhat related, employment stability
helps organizations avoid procyclical hiring and the higher associated costs of
facing greater competition in the labor market that stems from attempting to fiJ]
positions at the same time as other organizations (Greer & Stedham, 1989).
Given all the potential benefits of employment security, why don't more
organizations, especially in the U.S., seek to maintain greater employment
stability? One answer, of course, is that employment reductions represent a
quick and easily measurable way of reducing direct labor costs, which typically
represent the largest single operating cost category for an organization. In some
cases, the tendency to make these cuts may be reinforced by pressures from
security analysts. For example, the Wall Street Journal (J990) reponed that
"[securities] analysts said that Digital should cut 20% of its work force" to bring
revenues per employee up to a more acceptable level. Most costs of such
programs (e.g., severance pay, outplacement services) are usually taken during
one quaner in the form of a one-time charge. In subsequent quaners, an
organization can claim substantial cost reductions resulting from the lower
headcount (see Tomasko, 1990, p. ] 97 for examples).6
Although the immediate stock market reaction to such a move can be
positive, the long term consequences and market reaction are less cenain. For
Compensation and employment stability
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example, it is not clear at what point workforce reductions might cause revenues
to suffer. Kanter (1989) notes that in workforce reductions, sometimes the
"tasks haven't disappeared, just the people to do them" (p. 99). The direct
quantifiable costs such as severance pay, unemployment insurance taxes,
outplacement services, administrative costs, and continuation of health insurance
and other benefits (Bolt, 1985; Ward, ] 982) can also be quite large. The U.S.
General Accounting Office (1985), in fact, concluded that the costs of layoffs
often outstrip even the direct shon-term monetary savings.
In discussing costs and benefits, it may be useful to reiterate that
employment stability does not necessarily lead to overstaffmg (and lowered
revenues per employee ratios). In fact, under the "just in time" system of some
Japanese organizations, quite the opposite is true. The just in time system
"seeks to leave every plant with just enough--and only just enough--human and
material resources to keep its production process going" (Fucini & Fucini, ] 990,
p. 36). Thus, for example, the Mazda autOmobile plant in Flat Rock, Michigan
is claimed to operate with approximately ]5% fewer workers than comparable
U.S. plants.
The Flat Rock Ma7.da plant, and Japanese transplants in general, are
interesting cases because they highlight some of the trade-offs U.S. employees
under the Japanese system. As described above, in return for the commitment to
employment stability, management expects high levels of commitment and
flexibility from its workers. In concrete terms, this may include an agreement to
work at a very fast pace, which may have detrimental effects on safety and
health. It may also include pressure to forego vacation time and the expectation
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that employees be wiUing to work overtime on an hour's notice (Fucini &
Fucini, 1990, pp. 154-155). However one evaluates this trade-off, it does seem -
clear that such a system provides the opportunity for stable employment if
management is so inclined.
The Role of Compensation in Employment Stability
Given the substantial costs to organizations and employees of excessive
employment instability, what explains the relatively large degree of employment
instability in the U.S.? Two general explanations are examined here, both of
which have to do with the nature of the design of compensation systems.
First, U.S. managers may have less opportunity to reduce labor costs
without workforce reductions because pay is still largely a fixed cost in the U.S.
Consistent with the experience in Japan, Weitzman (1984) has argued that
linking employee pay to profits (e.g., using bonuses) contributes to employment
stability because it permits labor costs to decline automatically in poor economic
times. Otherwise, wages (panicularly in the U.S.) tend to be "sticky downward,"
thus encouraging employment reductions as a means of reducing labor costs.
Empirical support for the employment stability enhancing effects of variable pay
(e.g., the use of bonuses) has .been found in both Japan (Freeman & Weitzman,
1987) and the U.S. (Chelius & Smith, 1990), although the latter study focused
on economic downturns and had limited control of human capital investment.
Without controlling for human capital, one cannot rule out the possibility
organization differences in employment stability result from different levels of
investment in human capital.
Second, the often lamented short-term orientation of U.S. managers
Compensation and employment stability
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(Hayes & Abernathy, 1980) may also suggest less concern among U.S. managers
with decisions (like employment stability) that may have serious long-term rather
than short-term consequences. In Japan, management's commitment to
employment stability may be partly reflect the influence of the country's culture.
Stonich (1981) argues that "long-term perspectives are easy to maintain in such
an environment because the manager identifies with the interests of the group"
(p. 348).
By contrast, in the U.S., where a more individualistic culture may be less
likely to encourage employment stability, it may be necessary to focus more
attention on organization differences in factors such as the structure of
managerial compensation in explaining managerial behavior and decisions
(Stonich, 1981). There has long been a concern that U.S. managers do nOt
necessarily act in the best interests of other stakeholders (Berle & Means. 1932).
Agency theory, in fact, starts with the assumption that the interests of principals
(owners) and agents (managers) may not ordinarily be the same, and that the
design of the compensation system offers an important means of aligning the
goals of managers with those of owners. Evidence does indeed suggest that
owners choose different c~mpensation strategies than do managers, with
incentives being more aligned with the interests of owners in owner-controlled
organizations (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi & Hinkin, ] 987; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, ] 989).
One important dimension of compensation strategy is the degree to which
it encourages managers to focus on long-term vs. short-term objectives (Gomez-
Mejia & Welbourne, ]989; Rappaport, ]978; Salter, ]973; Stonich, 1981).
Rappaport (] 978) has argued that short-term managerial incentives may have
Compensation and employmcnt stability
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detrimental consequences for long-term performance. Investments in areas such
-
as research and development and employee development that may generate
improved future performance may be bypassed in favor of generating higher
quarterly or annual earnings. Cook (1990) has recommended using plans that
focus on long-term objectives as a means of getting managers to think like
owners. The announcement of such plans seems to elicit positive reactions from
the stock market (Brickley, Bhagat, & Lease, 1985). These types of plans may
also foster a greater concern for long-term investments in employees and thus,
employment stability.
To achieve stability, employment levels must be carefully managed not
just in poor economic times, but in good times as well (Dyer et aI., 1985).
During business downturns, for example, demand side actions could include
raising inventory levels. On the supply side, hiring freezes, cuts in ovenime,
early retirement incentives and so fonh may be used. During business upturns,
demand side actions might include avoiding shon-run or cyclical business and
making sure not to take on new business at tOo fast of a pace. On the supply
side, employment stability can be enhanced by careful control of hiring
"requisitions and greater use of ovenime. (See Dyer et al. for a comprehensive
review.)
Dyer et al. (1985) identified the philosophy of top management as a key
determinant of employment stability practices. Agency theory suggests that
compensation design, in turn, is likely to be an imponant influence on the
philosophy of top management and the organization's culture in general (Kerr &
Slocum, 1987). As discussed, compensation design can contribute to a greater
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long-term orientation among managers, which in turn, may make encourage them
to engage in the specific employment stability actions described above.
Hypotheses
My focus in this paper is on the possible link between managerial
compensation strategy and employment security. At least two aspects of
compensation are relevant and have the potential for independent effects on
employment stability: (a) the extent to which labor costs are fixed (versus
variable) costs, and (b) the degree to which the system encourages a long-term
orientation among managers who make employment decisions that affect others.
First, as described above, employment stability is likely to be greater
where the compensation system provides an alternative to layoffs in reducing
labor costs during poor economic times. Variable pay plans are often used as a
way of (as the term indicates) reducing fixed costs. Thus, where a portion of
pay depends on organizational performance (e.g., profitability), labor costs will
automatically decline during periods of low profitability, thus reducing the need
for cuning costs through employment reductions.
Second, a main thesis of the present paper is that in organizations where
the compensation system encourages a long-term orientation, employment
stability is likely to be greater. This long-ternl orientation may include a
similarly long-term, developmental approach to managing human resources,
which may often be reflected by an employment stability practice.
The preceding discussion suggests that compensation design may have
consequences for employment stability. Two specific hypotheses flow from this
discussion:
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HI: Employees will experience greater employment stability to
the extent that their own pay is variable (e.g., based on bonuses)
rather than fixed (e.g., base).
H2: Employees will experience greater employment stability to
the extent that the pay of decision-makers is tied to long-tenn
objectives of the organization.
METHOD
Sample
A large well-known compensation consulting finn provided survey data
collected during 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, penaining to over 20,000
tOp and middle level executives and managers in over 300 business units and
finns in each year. Roughly 95% designated themselves as freestanding
companies. The consulting firm collected the data by sending a questionnaire
each year to each organization asking that data on a representative sample of
jobs, managerial levels, and business units be provided. Each organization was
encouraged to repon data on at least 75 incumbents and most did so.
To be included in the final sample, an organization had to participate in
the survey for at least 3 years and be in a 2-digit or 3-digit S.1.C. industry that
had at least I other organization. As a result, the final sample contains 156
organizations. As described below, individual data were used to generate
organization averages do describe compensation practices. These averages were
based on over 10,000 individual level observations in each year.
The job families in the survey covered a broad range (e.g. top
executives, profit center heads, legal, employee relations, manufacturing,
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marketing, finance, government relations, information systems, research and
development/engineering, planning/acquisitions, general management, and
materials). As an example of the range of positions whhin job families, in
employee relations, data were collected on jobs ranging from the top personnel
executive (1985 average pay = $96,704) down to personnel manager (a generalist
under direct supervision of the top personnel executive, 1985 average pay =
$60,821).
Analyses and Measures
The dependent variables were the coefficient of variation lCV) for total
organization employment and the CV for exempt organization employment.
Note that the coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided
by the mean. Thus, for example, an organization with total employees of 10,000
in 1983, 11,000 in 1984, and 9,000 in 1985 would have a CV for total
employment of .08 (816/10,000).
The CV for employment is used because as Dyer et aI. (1985) have
argued, organizations that have employment stability practices, seek both
downward and upward stability. In other words, not only do such organizations
attempt to avoid layoffs iri business downturns, they also avoid staffing up too
quickly during business upturns. The CV in employment captures both aspects
of employment stability.
Independent variables were also defined at the organization level and fell
into three sets: compensation, organization financial performance, and industry.
Compensation strategy variables included managerial base pay. the use of
long-term incentives (LTl. I =yes, 0 =no), and the ratio of bonus to base pay.
Compensation and employment stability
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All variables measured in dollars were scaled in 1980 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index.
It is important to note, however, that the preceding compensation
variables were adjusted for important individual (or human capital) and job
factors. (See Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990 for additional information.) Human
capital variables included years of education, years of potential labor market
experience (age - years of education - 6?, firm tenure, job tenure, and squared
terms for the latter three variables, consistent with human capital theory's
prediction of diminishing returns to experience (negative signs on the squared
terms). This adjustment is important because otherwise, organization differences
in employment stability could arise from different levels of investment in human
capital, particularly firm-specific human capital. Adjustments were also made for
two job characteristics measures: (a) the number of reporting levels from the
board of directors to the position of the incumbent, and (b) the number of
management levels supervised.
The following equation was estimated:
Yjt = XitB + eit (1)
where Y is a vector of observations on a compensation dependent variable for i
persons at time t (i.e. data are pooled across years). X is a matrix of
observations on individual and job factors, B is a coefficient vector, and e is an
error term that includes unmeasured causes of Y.
Each of the compensation variables (organization base pay, organization
bonus/base, and organization long-term incentive eligibility) were defined as the
organization's average residual (i.e., the organization average of the e,ts) for that
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compensation variable over the period of the study. (The fIrst year of
compensation data came from the year prior to the first year in which
employment was measured and the last year of compensation data came from
the year preceding the last year in which employment was measured.) Thus, for
example, in the case of base pay, individual employees with positive residuals
from (1) are paid more than would be predicted from their individual and job
characteristics. If positive residuals for employees within a panicular
organization tend to be positive, then that organization's average residual would
also be positive. The implication would be that the organization pays a base
salary that is above the market defined by the organizations in the survey.
Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) found that these adjusted organization
averages were stable over time, indicating, for example, that organizations with
high adjusted variable pay in one time period were also likely to have high
adjusted variable pay several years later. This stability evidence is consistent
with Mintzberg's (1978) definition of a realized strategy, "a sequence of
decisions in some area [which] exhibits consistency over time" (p. 935). Gerhart
and Milkovich also found significant convergence between these realized
compensation strategies ~d intended pay polices.
The second set of independent variables was designed to control for
variation over time in organization performance, in recognition of the fact that
labor demand is derived from the organization' s product demand and financial
health. These variables included the CY of sales. CY of profits. CY of
stockholders' equity, and the CY of total assets. Each of these variables was
measured one year prior to the measurement of employment.
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The third set of independent variables were Industry categories (dummy
variables). Organizations were classified into either 2-digit SIC codes, or where
possible, intO the more precise 3-digit categories.
The following equation was estimated to examine the impact of
compensation design on employment stability:
CV Employmentj =CV PerfjW + CompJZ + uJ (2)
where CV Employment is a vector of observations on j organizations'
employment variability (total or exempt), CV Perf is a matrix of observations on
organizations' variability in organization financial performance, Comp is a matrix
of observations on the average adjusted compensation variables, W and Z are
regression coefficient vectors, and u is an error term that includes unmeasured
causes of employment variability. In some cases, industry controls are also
added to equation (2).
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the CV of exempt employment as the
dependent variable in equation (2) because information on base pay and bonuses
(and thus on the extent to which pay is fixed vs. variable) is available only for
exempt employees in our sample. Hypothesis 2 is tested using the CV of total
..
employment as the dependent variable, because in organizations where
management is compensated for taking a long-term perspective, they may be
more likely to make decisions that maintain employment stability among their
employees. Both hYPOtheses are tested with all three compensation variables in
the model to control for pay level. One-tailed statistical significance tests are
used in evaluating the effects of variation in organization performance and in
testing the hypotheses. Otherwise, two-tailed tests are applied.
Compensation and employment stability
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RESULTS
Table 1 reports estimates of equation (2) with and without industry
controls using both the CV of exempt employment and the CV of total
employment as dependent variables. The statistically significant negative
coefficient estimates for bonuslbase suggest that exempt employment is less
variable in organizations that rely more heavily on bonuses in paying their top
and middle managers. The statistically significant coefficient on LTI in the last
CV of exempt employees equation suggests also that exempt employment is less
variable to the extent that its compensation is in the form of long term
incentives. Both findings support hypothesis 1, suggesting that those on variable
pay (including long-term incentives) may be less subject to employment
cutbacks. In other words, management itself may be less vulnerable to
employment instability if its own compensation is variable, moving in
conjunction with the organization's ability to pay.
The negative coefficient on LTI in the CV of total employment equations
indicates less variation in employment in organizations that rely more heavily on
long term incentives for their top and middle level managers. This finding is
consistent with hypothesis- 2, indicating that an emphasis on long-term incentives
may encourage managers to manage fluctuations in the employment of others
more carefully,S However, the nonsignificant coefficient on the bonuslbase ratio
in the same equations does not provide any direct evidence that encouraging
managers to focus on short-term results contributes to volatility in total
employment. One possibiliry is thar the bonus/base ratio for top and middle
managers is positively associated with the bonuslbase ratio for lower level
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employees. If so, any positive effect on variation in tOtal employment of a
shon-tenn focus among top and middle managers might be offset by a reduced
need to control labor costs through workforce reductions because employees' pay
is also variable in the shon-run, making tOtal labor costs somewhat flexible,
even without changes in employment level.
None of the base pay coefficients were statistically significant, perhaps
suggesting that pay level may not be an imponant detenninant of employment
stability. Note, however, that pay level may have effects on employment level
because, for example, organizations may substitute capital for labor when the
latter is expensive. Moreover, even if employment level remains the same, its
composition may change to include different employees in different pans of the
country (or in other countries) who accept lower pay.
Other results indicate that variation in sales may be more imponant than
variation in profits, assets, or stockholders' equity in detennining employment
stability. The weak coefficient on the CV of profits, however, may be panly an
anifact of the panicular analyses used here because negative mean profits over
time would result in a negative CV for profits. The problem is that a negative
CV does not indicate a lack of variability. Therefore, the equations were re-
estimated after dropping organizations having negative CVs for profits. This
alternative estimation procedure left the coefficients on the compensation
variables largely unchanged. but increased the magnitude of the coefficient on
the CV of profits variable. For example. in the model for CV of total
employment (with industry controls). the coefficient increased seven-fold to .014
(t = 2.34).9
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DISCUSSION
During the 1960-1987 period, productivity grew in Japan at an annual
average rate of 7.7%, compared to 2.8% for the U.S. (Neef & Thomas, 1988).
Although many factors may contribute to this differential (e.g., cost of capital,
age of physical plant, cultural homogeneity), a good deal of attention has been
focused on the role of Japan's employment system, an imponant aspect of which
is lifetime employment for approximately 30% of the labor force. Although
there are also U.S. organizations that practice employment stability, evidence
provided earlier suggests that the average Japanese employee is significantly less
likely to be involuntarily terminated than the average U.S. employee.
Although the precise role of employment stability in Japan's success
cannot be established, the differences between the U.S. and Japan raise the
following questions: Why is there so much less employment stability in the
U.S.? What factors account for employment stability differences between U.S.
organizations? I suggested that compensation strategy was an imponant factor,
especially in explaining differences between organizations within the U.S. This
general hypothesis was supponed by the following results.
First, exempt employees experienced less employment variability to the
extent that their pay was variable. In contrast, exempt employees receiving the
bulk of their pay in the form of a base salary were more susceptible to
fluctuations, perhaps because their labor costs were not as flexible downward.
Consequently, in poor economic times, it is difficult to reduce their labor costs
without workforce reductions. In contrast, where pay is variable, depending on
shon- or long-term organization performance. labor costs are automatically
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reduced somewhat during economic difficulties without employment reductions.
These results are consistent with previous research (Chelius & Smith, 1990;
Freeman & Weitzman, 1987) and provide suppon for Weitzman's (1984) share
economy model.
Second, total employment fluctuated less when top and middle managers
were encouraged to take a long-term view by an emphasis on long-term
incentive plans in the compensation system. It may be that management is more
concerned with protecting investment in human capital and building employee
commitment/involvement when the compensation system is more oriented toward
rewarding long-term organization success. Under such conditions, they may, for
example, be more likely to engage in the kinds of specific employment
stabilization actions described by Dyer et al. (1985).
More generally, this evidence is consistent with the general agency theory
prediction that compensation is an imponant tool for aligning the interests of
managers with those of owners. The fmdings are also consistent with the
emphasis in the compensation literature on the power of compensation design for
determining the time horizon taken by managers (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne,
1989; Rappapon, 1978; Salter, 1973; StOnich, 1981).
Funher, it is wonh noting that these compensation strategy effects were
obtained after controlling for other potential key detem1inants of employment
stability such as level of investment in human capital and the product demand
and financial health of the orgaI}izations. Therefore, despite the fact that labor is
a derived demand, it appears that managers still have considerable discretion in
their decisions regarding employment. This range of discretion may be broader
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in organizations that rely more heavily on variable pay. Moreover, within this
range of ctiscretion, the time orientation of management's compensation design
may be an imponant detenninant of employment decisions.
The present study adds to the general case for the critical imponance of
compensation in explaining imponant attitudes and behaviors. We have evidence
that compensation design influences organizational perfonnance (Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1990), individual perfonnance in both manual (see Dyer and Schwab,
1982 for a review) and managerial jobs (Kahn & Sherer, 1990), retention of
high perfonners (Gerhart, 1990), pay satisfaction (see Heneman, 1985 for a
review), and now, employment stability.
There are several limitations and areas where future research would be
useful. First, the approach of the present study implies that compensation
influence organizational culture and managerial objectives, which in turn,
influences managerial behaviors and thus, organization outcomes like employment
stability. The causal process, however, may well be more complex. For
example, a particular culture and organization strategy may influence the design
of the compensation system. As one example, Milkovich, Gerhart, and Hannon
(fonhcoming) suggested that greater research and development intensity in an
organization contributed to a greater use of variable pay, especially long-tenn
incentives, for managers.
Narrower managerial objectives may also influence the design of the
compensation system, especially in management-controlled organizations (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 1987). In these organizations, tOp managers may have considerable
influence on the composition of the board of directors and the compensation
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committee, both of which influence top managers' pay. In fact, O'Reilly, Main,
and Crystal (1988) found that the compensation levels of the members of these
two groups were strongly associated with the pay of the CEO. Some interpret
this to mean that managers from different organizations approve lucrative pay
plans for each other and then use these pay plans of others to justify higher pay
for themselves (Fonune, 1990).
Second, cross-country comparisons of compensation, organization
performance, and employment stability would be of great interest. The
descriptive information reviewed here, of course, suggests significant country
differences in employment stability. Additionally, it seems clear that both pay
and purchasing power are substantially higher in the U.S. than anywhere else
(Modic, 1989, Nelson-Horchler, 1990). Differentials betw~en top management
and the average manufacturing worker also seem to differ significantly from
country to country. In the U.S., the average CEO makes 35 times as much as
the average manufacturing employee. In Japan and Europe, the comparable
ratios are 15 and 20, respectively (Nelson-Horchler, 1990). It would be useful
to more systematically examine the possible consequences of these national
differences in compensation practices.
Third, although the Japanese experience suggests the possible benefits of
an employment stability strategy, it would be useful to obtain data on possible
performance differences between U.S. organizations having different employment
stability practices. This question could be studied most effectively by using
'longitudinal data because actions geared toward the long run (e.g., building
employee commitment through employment stability) will, by definition, have the
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most visible payoffs in the long-term. In fact, such actions may carry significant
shon-term costs.
We also need to develop a theory that explains when an employment
stability strategy would make most sense (i.e., a contingency theory). As one
example, the Japanese tend to couple employment stability with extremely
careful applicant screening and employee selection in both Japan (Hashimoto,
1990a) and the U.S. (Business Week, 1988). The likely explanation is that
where employees cannot be terminated easily, more care is necessary in selecting
employees. The Dyer and Holder (1988) paper offers some additional ideas
regarding the types of human resource and organization strategy combinations
that make sense.
Whatever its consequences for organizations' financial performance, it is
clear that employment stability is also an imponant objective in its own right,
especially among employees concerned about their own jobs and among those
concerned with public policies dealing with worker displacement and job loss.
A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics survey reponed that 4.6 miUion workers, 20
years and older and having at least 3 years of tenure with an employer, had
been displaced in the 1983-1987 period (Herz, 1990). Of this group, 72% were
re-employed by 1988. In this subset, the average nominal earnings loss was
14%, exclusive of benefits.lO These displacements took place in an expansionary
period. The number of displacements and size of economic losses were greater
during the downturn of the early 1980s (Flaim & Sehgal, 1985). These findings
lend funher imponance to understanding the causes of employment stability.
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Dependent Variable
CV Total CV Total CV Exempt CV Exempt
Employment Employment Employment Employment
Mean
Variable
CV Total Employees .10
CV Exempt Employees .13
CV Profits -.08 .002 .002* .002 .002
(0.76) (1.31) (0.61) (0.78)
CY Sales .11 .307** .302** .256** .225**
(3.47) (4.00) (2.07) (2.23)
CY Assets .14 .082 .052 .145* .122*
(1.12) (0.85) (1.41) (1.48)
CY Equity .16 .064** .054** .021 .052*
(1.93) (1.94) (0.45) (1.39)
LTI .00 -.053** -.065** -.046 -.058**
(1.80) (2.57) (1.11) (1.70)
Log Base .00 .012 .014 .055 .065
(0.26) (0.39) (0.84) (1.34)
Bonus/Base .00 .066 -.023 -.222** -.184**
(0.77) (0.32) (1.84) (1.93)
Industry Yes No Yes No
Controls
'"R2
.450 .257 .326 .164
N = 156 organizations
Note: LTI, Log Base, and Bonus/Base are adjusted organization averages (see text).
* p < .10, one-tailed
** p < .05, one-tailed
Table 1
Variation in Employment, Variation in Organization Performance, and Managerial Compensation
FOOTNOTES
Un both countries, "regular" employees are buffered from product demand fluctuations in many
organizations through the use of temporary workers, subcontracting, etc.
2. Only recently (January 1991), Digital Equipment Company announced its first layoffs.
3. As a recent example of the Japanese commitment to employment security, consider that the three
largest Japanese steel companies plan workforce reductions totalling 40,000 in a 3-year period in
response to modernization and reduced capacity. But, they plan to accomplish the reductions
without laying off any employees (Mroczowski & Hanaoka, 1989).
4.However, as Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) found, difficulties in cross-cultural comparisons of self-
reports may make it difficult to detect the hypothesized differences in reports of commitment. One
possible explanation may stem from the fact that higher commitment would be most likely among
Japan's "regular" workforce, which composes about 30% of the total workforce. Lincoln and
Kalleberg did not limit their Japanese sample to regular workers.
5.0sterman (1987) notes that the General Motors/Saturn-United Auto Workers (UAW) contract
contains the following language: "Saturn recognizes that people are the most valuable
asset...Accordingly, Saturn will hot layoff Saturn members [regular employees] except in situations
arising from unforseen or catastrophic events or severe economic conditions." In return, the UAW
has, for example, agreed to a very small number of job classifications, which gives General Motors
greater flexibility in work assignments.
6 .From a public policy perspective, employment stability is also a desirable goal. The effects of
job loss on individuals can be serious in economic (Jacobson, 1984; Gerhart & Jarley, 1987) as
well as medical and psychological terms (Brenner, 1976, cited in Reich, 1983, p. 204).
7. In cases where a direct measure of years in the labor force is not available, this formula is used
in the economics literature to estimate the number of years that a person could have participated in
the labor force.
8.Adding the means for the performance variables and employment over the study period did not
change the pattern of results.
9 . Support for hypotheses 1 and 2 was also robust to adding controls for levels of employment,
sales, profits, assets, and equity duiing the study period.
10 . This loss estimate does not incorporate the earnings losses incurred while in between jobs.
Psychological consequences (mentioned earlier) are another consideration. About 70% of the total
109 million U.S. employees have 3 years or more of tenure with their current employer (Carey,
1988, p. 11). Thus, 4.6 million displacements represent about 6% of this group.
